Contents

Introduction
Every day we are faced with human behavior that is puzzling and that we would like to understand. Why was the fellow in the coffee shop smiling?
Why does my longtime friend no longer call? Why did the policemen beat the suspect? Answers to these questions come in the form of behavior explanations, which are a fundamental tool of social cognition and thus part of the cognitive apparatus with which humans make sense of themselves, other people, and the complexities of the social world. Without the ability to construct explanations, human social behavior would be a series of actions and reactions, driven mostly by power and resources. With behavior explanations, social behavior can be highly complex and nuanced yet still comprehensible, allowing for often impressively coordinated interactions that rely on mutual understanding and attunement. Behavior explanations help people find meaning in social interaction-from a flirting glance to a quirky apology, from a friend's well-meaning gibe to a colleague's disguised provocation.
But behavior explanations are not only in the mind, furnishing insight, understanding, and meaning for participants and observers of social interaction. Behavior explanations are also overt verbal actions used for social purposes, and in particular for managing ongoing interactions. When asked why they did something, people verbally explain their behavior and thereby facilitate interpersonal coordination, or they try to save face, justifying a questionable action. Similarly, people offer explanations for others' behavior, sometimes making the agent look good, sometimes not.
Thus, behavior explanations are in the mind when people try to find meaning in the stream of behaviors and events around them, and behavior explanations are social actions when people use them for persuasion, communication, and impression management.
This book attempts to unite these two aspects of explanation within a comprehensive theoretical model that also illuminates why the two aspects exist and why they are intimately tied to each other. In presenting this model, I hope to advance our knowledge and understanding of behavior explanations in general and of the central role they play in both social cognition and social interaction. Equally important, I hope to instill in the reader the kind of awe that I have gained for the sophisticated and subtle patterns of folk behavior explanation. Next to language and self-consciousness, social cognition-and behavior explanation as one of its major tools-is arguably the most astounding advance of human evolution, and it deserves both detailed scientific attention and profound admiration.
But the informed reader may wonder why we need another theory of behavior explanation. Don't we have enough attribution theories already? Indeed, the phenomenon of behavior explanation has been studied under the heading of attribution theory for a long time and by many researchers. However, the "attribution" label refers to a variety of phenomena, including not only authentic explanations but also trait inferences, causal judgments, and responsibility ascriptions. I will argue that theories of the latter phenomena (especially of trait inferences) have repeatedly and mistakenly been applied to the phenomenon of behavior explanations, neglecting both the unique conceptual framework that underlies these explanations and their dual nature as meaning-making and interaction-managing tools. This is then the reason why we need a new theory: Because there hasn't been one offered that genuinely accounts for behavior explanations.
To support this historical claim, I devote chapter 1 to a review of the major theories of attribution and attempt to clarify why behavior explanations have somehow been mistaken for trait inferences or simple causal judgments. Chapter 1 also assembles some of the insights that the attribution tradition and its successors have offered-insights without which no theory of behavior explanations would be possible. Readers from outside social psychology might save this chapter for later, as the actual theoretical contributions starting in chapter 2 are independent of the historical argument. Social psychologists, I hope, will read this chapter with an open mind, as I paint a picture of attribution research that differs significantly from that found in traditional textbooks. I have tried to be historically accurate, using many direct quotes to illustrate what past attribution scholars have really said, but 2 Introduction whether this will suffice to change the textbook portrayal of attribution theory remains to be seen.
The theory of behavior explanations I propose characterizes explanations as deeply embedded in people's conceptual framework of mind and behavior (often called theory of mind). In fact, it is by virtue of this conceptual framework that humans can explain behavior at all. Thus, in chapter 2, I devote significant attention to the nature, function, and origins of theory of mind and the place of behavior explanations within it. This discussion draws heavily on extant developmental, clinical, philosophical, and evolutionary work but ties these different strands together into an integrated foundation for the study of behavior explanations.
In chapter 3 I turn to the antecedents of behavior explanations-when and for what purposes people form explanations. I explore what people gain when they find "meaning" in a behavior through private (in-the-mind) explanations and when they manage interactions through communicative explanations. I also discuss why people so often wonder about other people's actions but about their own experiences and what implications this pattern might have for the language of human behavior.
The introduction of the actual theory of behavior explanation spans two chapters. Chapter 4 focuses on the conceptual structure of explanationsthe concepts of intentionality and mental states that fundamentally shape the way humans see, interpret, and respond to behavior. This conceptual structure gives rise to four distinct modes of explanation and significant features of each mode. Chapter 5 examines the processes involved in the actual construction of explanations, including the choices between multiple modes and features of explanation, the psychological determinants of these choices, and the cognitive processes that underlie the selection of specific explanations in specific contexts.
The theory of behavior explanations is then applied to a number of fascinating questions. Chapter 6 analyzes the significant linguistic, communicative, and interpersonal aspects of behavior explanations-aspects that are often ignored by traditional person-situation models of attribution. In particular, I examine the specific linguistic tools by which behaviors and their explanations get expressed and the broader question of how explanations as communicative acts are used for social, impression-managing purposes.
Chapter 7 takes up the accepted insight that explanations of one's own behavior differ from explanations of other people's behavior. But exactly how Introduction 3 they differ, and why, are questions that are answered very differently by the folk-conceptual theory of explanation and traditional attribution theory. In fact, whereas we can find reliable actor-observer asymmetries in explanatory parameters described by the folk-conceptual theory, the seemingly consistent body of research on person-situation differences between actors and observers may well be based on misinterpretations of the evidence.
Another fascinating question concerns potential differences in the way people explain individual persons' behaviors and whole groups' behaviors (chapter 8). The folk-conceptual theory of explanation allows us to develop a solid prediction about the nature of differences between individual and group behavior explanations, and the data so far support this prediction.
Moreover, a detailed inspection of how explanations are used in propaganda supporting or disparaging various groups reveals once more the interplay of the meaning-finding and impression-managing aspects of explanations.
Chapter 9 begins with a summary of the insights gained, especially about the multiple functions of behavior explanations and the key role of a theory of mind therein. I then highlight the relative strengths of folk-conceptual theory over traditional attribution theory but also enumerate open questions that the folk-conceptual theory currently does not answer. I close with a number of research applications of this theory, from psychopathology to intimate relationships to political conflict. then introduce a theory of behavior explanations that builds on previous theories but also tries to remove some of their difficulties and, in particular, tries to be a genuine theory of behavior explanations, not one of trait inferences, causal judgments, or responsibility ascriptions.
Attribution as Perception: Heider
Psychological research on attribution began with the work of Fritz Heider, who developed models of attribution for both object perception and person perception. His theory of object perception (first described in his 1920 dissertation) is rarely cited today, but it serves as the foundation for his later theory of person perception, so I will briefly review it (see also Malle and Ickes 2000).
Object Perception
Heider's early theorizing was an attempt to solve one of the core philosophical problems of phenomenology: the relation between sense qualities and real objects. That is, Heider asked how it was possible that we take sense qualities to be qualities of objects, given that sense qualities are "here" in the mind, whereas object qualities are "out there" in the physical world.
Heider's answer began with the distinction between things (physical objects) and the media by which things affect the perceiver (Heider 1920 (Heider , 1925 see also 1959) . For example, a ticking watch (thing) causes systematic air vibrations around it (medium), which in turn engage the eardrum (another medium) and lead to perception. Heider argued that media have a considerable degree of variance but are shaped by the relative invariance of things.
The perceptual apparatus reconstructs things from their effects on the me- The second crucial difference between person perception and object perception is that when people perform a causal (i.e., "attributional") analysis of human behavior, their judgments of causality follow one of two conceptual models (ibid., chap. 4). The first is a model of impersonal causality, applied to unintentional human behaviors (such as sneezing or feeling pain)
as well as physical events (such as stones rolling or leaves falling). The second is a model of personal causality, applied only to human agents who perform an intentional action (such as cleaning the kitchen or inviting someone to dinner). "Personal causality," Heider wrote, "refers to instances in which p causes x intentionally. That is to say, the action is purposive" (ibid., p. 100).
Heider and the Person-Situation Distinction
Ensuing attribution research set aside Heider's distinction between personal and impersonal causality and claimed instead that Heider had argued for a distinction between person (or internal) causes and situation (or external) causes of behavior. 3 That is, when people try to explain behavior, they attempt to find out whether the behavior was caused by factors internal to the person (e.g., mood, motives, personality) or by factors in the external situation (e.g., physical environment, other people). But even though Heider at times referred to these two classes of internal/person and external/situation causes (see below), the distinction he cared far more about was that between personal and impersonal causality, a distinction that refers to two kinds of behaviors (intentional and unintentional) and the different ways people think about them. Second and far more important is the problem that researchers working with the person-situation distinction began to omit a major element of human social cognition: the distinction between intentional and unintentional behavior. Because it seemed so easy to classify any explanation as either referring to the person or the situation, researchers stopped tracking whether the behavior explained was actually intentional or unintentional-but that was exactly what the personal-impersonal distinction was supposed to capture. This omission mattered a great deal because the intentionality distinction plays an essential role in the interpretation and social control of behavior and in the evaluation of morality. The dichotomy between person and situation causes fails to capture all these important roles.
But why has it been believed that Heider proposed a person-situation dichotomy in attribution? One section in particular may have spawned this belief (ibid., 1958, pp. 82-84) . There Heider endorsed Lewin's famous equation that characterizes any "action outcome" (the result of an action) as "dependent upon a combination of effective personal force and effective environmental force" (p. 82). As is clear from elaborations of this claim (pp. 83-87), Heider argued that for an action outcome to occur (which is sometimes just the performance of the action itself), there needs to be a concomitance of two elements: the agent's attempt to perform the action (trying) and supporting factors (can) that lie in the agent (e.g., ability, confidence) or in the environment (e.g., opportunity, luck, favorable conditions).
Heider catalogued here the necessary elements that have to join together for an intentional action to succeed in producing its desired outcome-the "conditions of successful action" (p. 110). Consequently, when people point If a pitcher who wishes to retire a batter (motivation) throws a burning fastball (action) directly into the wind (environmental influence), then the observer should conclude that the pitcher has a particularly strong arm (ability). If a batter tries to hit that ball (motivation) but fails (action), then the observer should conclude that the batter lacked coordination (ability) or was blinded by the sun (environmental influence).
The observer's reasoning in this passage is entirely focused on accounting for successful or failed outcomes; the question why the batter and the pitcher acted as they did is not answered by reference to either arm, wind, or sun. The why-question is in fact already answered by mentioning the pitcher's obvious desire to retire the batter and the batter's wish to hit the ball and get a run. As in virtually all cases of enabling factor explanations, in this case too, the question why the agent acted is not at issue (because the answer is obvious); what is at issue is the question how the outcome was attained (Malle et al. 2000) .
In an interview with Bill Ickes (1976, p. 14), Heider explicitly distinguished between these two types of question, and hence between two types of explanation:
1 the attribution of outcomes to causal factors (i.e., enabling factor explanations); 4 2. the attribution of intentional actions to the actor's motives (i.e., reasons for acting). In both of these passages, the authors treat two different explanatory questions as if they were one and the same. The judgment whether "he did it because he wanted to" or "because he had to do it" clarifies the agent's motives for acting (by means of a reason explanation). These reasons can be given even before the agent tries to perform the action (because reasons explain the intention, whether or not it gets fulfilled). By contrast, the judgment as to whether ability, effort, or external forces enabled the action outcome clarifies how it was possible that the action outcome was attained (by means of an enabling factor explanation). Enabling explanations can be given only after the agent 5 tried to perform the action-if she succeeded, for example, one might say it was because of her ability.
Because these two explanation types-reason explanations (motive attributions) and enabling factor explanations (outcome attributions)-answer such different questions, it is unfortunate that the attribution literature after et al. 2000) . Much confusion in the attribution literature resulted from this collapse, and I will propose an alternative theory in chapters 4 and 5.
Summary
The were long overlooked by attribution researchers.
Attribution as Trait Inference: Jones and Davis
Two years after its publication, Heider's (1958) attribution work was lauded To say that an inference is correspondent, then, is to say that a disposition is being rather directly reflected in behavior, and that this disposition is unusual in its strength or intensity. Operationally, correspondence means ratings toward the extremes of trait dimensions which are given with confidence. ( Jones and Davis 1965, p. 264) Jones and Davis thus sidestepped the social perceiver's task of inferring the agent's reasons for acting and instead provided a theory of inferring traits.
As David Hamilton (1998) put it, "correspondent-inference theory was an important theory of how people make dispositional inferences, but not re- process" and action perception in general, a position that would soon dominate the field (see, e.g., Shaver 1975).
A Saving Effort
Daniel Gilbert (1998) Second, the act-effects analysis works alright so long as the action in question is a choice between clearly demarcated options that have a manageable set of effects. But many human actions are not like that, which causes problems for the analysis. For one thing, we have to assume that the perceiver selects the agent's relevant options of acting from sheer infinite possibilities, but correspondent inference theory is silent on how this selection might work. In addition, we have to assume that the perceiver considers each po-14 Chapter 1 tential action's relevant effects, and here, too, the theory is silent on how this selection from another set of infinite possibilities might work.
Third, Jones and Davis's model of intention inferences (via noncommon
and undesirable action effects) will typically yield only an answer to the question of what the person was doing, not why she was doing it-as the authors themselves point out (1965, pp. 222, 228) . Granted, sometimes a redescription of a movement pattern in terms of action verbs (e.g., "He was walking toward the window") will be informative and hint at possible explanations, but it will not itself supply these explanations. That is, it will not answer the question "Why was he walking toward the window?" Sub- force. The later stage is called "attributional," but it is concerned with either inferring or not inferring an extraordinary disposition-a process quite distinct from ascribing motives or reasons for why the person acted.
Summary
Jones and Davis (1965) introduced an important issue in social perception
by asking under what conditions people infer traits from (single) behaviors.
Their theorizing about these correspondent inferences was highly influential, leading to research on the "fundamental attribution error" (Ross 1977), stereotypes (e.g., Gilbert and Hixon 1991; Yzerbyt, Rogier, and Fiske 1998), and the cognitive underpinnings of impression formation (e.g., Gilbert and Malone 1995; Trope 1986). However, even under the most charitable reconstruction, Jones and Davis (or theorists in their wake) have not offered a theory of how ordinary people explain behavior, only how they infer traits from behavior-two processes that are just not the same (Hilton, Smith, and Kin 1995; Hamilton 1998).
Attribution as Causal Judgment: Kelley
Kelley's (1967) paper, "Attribution theory in social psychology," is generally considered the first systematic and general treatment of lay causal explanations. Kelley's self-ascribed goal in the paper was "to highlight some of the 2. The procedure of arriving at these external or internal attributions is analogous to experimental methodology.
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Two issues require discussion here, one historical, the other substantive.
The historical one concerns Kelley's claim that the two ideas just listed were indeed central to Heider's theory. The substantive issue concerns the claim that the two ideas together provide a strong foundation for a theory of behavior explanation.
The Historical Issue: Kelley Representing Heider
Evidence for the claim that Heider considered the attribution process a choice between external and internal causes appears strong if we consult secondary literature on attribution, but, as argued earlier, this appearance is based on a misrepresentation of Heider's theory. For Heider, the personalimpersonal distinction was more fundamental than the external-internal distinction because it identified two very different domains of causality.
Only when there is no intention causing the event (i.e., in the case of impersonal/unintentional events and outcomes) does the external-internal dichotomy apply. Explanations of intentional action, by contrast, are based on the conceptual framework of personal causality, which involves intentionality and the agent's reasons.
Support for Kelley's second claim, that Heider considered the attribution process analogous to experimental methodology, lies in a quote from the very end of Heider's book (Heider 1958, p. 297) , which is itself largely based on the section "Attribution of Desire and Pleasure" (ibid., pp. 146-160). But in that section Heider focuses entirely on the attribution of unintentional events (such as enjoyment); and to such unintentional events, both the external-internal distinction and the strategy of covariation assessment apply.
Heider never claimed, however, that all behavioral events are explained that way. In particular, nowhere did he argue that the external-internal distinction and the strategy of covariation assessment provide a model of how people explain intentional action. Over the years, Kelley's covariation model and its refinements were tested empirically and appeared to receive reasonable support (e.g., Cheng and Novick 1990; Försterling 1992; McArthur 1972) . 9 However, all that these tests showed was that people can take covariation information into account when it is made available to them; none of the tests showed that people actually seek out covariation information on their own (cf. Ahn et al. 1995) .
People may seek out covariation information for such unintentional events as headaches or moods and such outcomes as success or failure. But covariation reasoning about person and situation causes is surely not the exclusive process by which people go about explaining behavior, and it is actually quite ineffectual in the case of explaining intentional actions. (For a continued discussion of covariation reasoning, see 5.4.)
Summary
Kelley's (1967) model of attribution contains two core propositions: (a) that attribution is a choice between external and internal causes and (b) that the cognitive procedure by which people arrive at this choice is covariation assessment. Both propositions are problematic. First, the internal-external dimension cannot be the foundation of a theory of behavior explanation because, though it may be an important distinction in the explanation of unintentional events, it simply does not capture people's explanations of intentional action. Second, covariation assessment is not the only method by which people arrive at explanations. In the straightforward causal model that underlies explanations of unintentional events, covariation reasoning may be useful (though not essential; see Ahn et al. 1995; Johnson, Long, and Robinson 2001; Lalljee and Abelson 1983; Read, 1987) . But the causal model of intentional action is far more complex as it involves intentions, subjective reasons, and rationality (Malle 1999). Covariation reasoning can, at best, assist in constructing reason explanations of intentional action.
Subsequent Attribution Research
The three classic works by Heider, Jones and Davis, and Kelley were of course not the only important contributions to the study of behavior explanation.
A number of scholars proposed theoretical additions, refinements, and extensions of attribution theory. I discuss these contributions under four headings: expanded causal dimensions, refined trait inference models, reasons and goals, and conversational processes. Despite their partial success, these contributions still left some old questions unanswered and raised several new ones. By the end of this review, then, we will be able to gather a list of desiderata that a theory of behavior explanations needs to satisfy.
Expanded Causal Dimensions
In the early 1970s, Bernard Weiner analyzed the domain of achievements and, in particular, the emotions and motivations people have toward others who succeed or fail. He relied on Heider's early insights and introduced the causal dimension of stability to complement the common one of externality-internality (Weiner et al. 1972) . Empirical studies showed that people who failed because of lack of effort (unstable internal) were evaluated more negatively than those who failed because of inability (stable internal).
(For a review see Weiner 1986.) Later Weiner also analyzed other outcomes that happen to people, such as illnesses, unemployment, or obesity. To account for the systematic differences in people's emotions and evaluations toward these outcomes, Weiner introduced the dimension of controllability (1995) . Accordingly, empirical studies showed that people are more angry at agents who suffer negative outcomes brought about by controllable causes (e.g., an illness because of risky behavior) than agents who suffer negative outcomes brought about by uncontrollable causes (e.g., an illness because of a genetic precondition). Finally, Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978) analyzed the cognitive processes underlying helplessness and depression and proposed globality as a further dimension of causes. They suggested that attributing negative outcomes to global causes (especially if they are also internal and stable) was associated with higher degrees of helplessness What all these proposals have in common is that they deal primarily with explanations of and emotional responses to outcomes, which are unintentional events. It may well be important to distinguish causes of unintentional events along a variety of dimensions (such as internality, stability, 
Refined Trait Inference Models
I described earlier how Jones and Davis's seminal paper from 1965 subtly turned attention away from action explanation and toward trait inferences.
This shift had a lasting impact on attribution research, as is still visible in the numerous theoretical models on how and when people infer traits from single behaviors (e.g., Carlston and Skowronski 1994; Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull 1988; Newman and Uleman 1989; Quattrone 1982; Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz 1977; Trope 1986 ). These models describe with great sophistication the process sequence from observing a behavior to inferring a correspondent trait (and adjusting or not adjusting this inference by considering situational forces). But it would be a mistake to assume that these trait inference models describe the process sequence of behavior explanations. Trait inferences and behavior explanations are plainly different processes, with different cognitive and social functions and different conceptual requirements (Fein 2001; Hamilton 1998; Hilton, Smith, and Kin 1995; Malle 1999) .
The methodology, too, of traditional trait inference studies does not reveal anything about behavior explanations. In these studies, by and large following a classic paradigm ( Jones and Harris 1967), participants are asked to indicate high or low ratings on trait, attitude, or ability scales; they are never asked to explain why the target person acted as she did.
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A new trend, however, promises to lift some of these restrictions on trait inference work. Research that began with Read, Jones, and Miller (1990) has shown that many trait inferences are based on reason explanations or motive ascriptions (Ames in press; Kammrath, Mendoza-Denton, and Mischel 2003; Reeder et al. 2002; Shoda and Mischel 1993) . For example, when inferring an agent's morality, aggressiveness, or helpfulness from a given action, perceivers consider the agent's motives and reasons for her action and thus appear to construct behavior explanations before (or while) drawing a trait inference from it. The temporal ordering of these processes is not yet solidly established, but the changes in methodology that these studies introduced (presenting intentional stimulus behaviors and asking people to ascribe motives) represent a critical step forward in reconnecting the two strands of attribution-work on behavior explanations and work on trait inferences.
Reasons and Goals
In 1978 But it remained unclear exactly how the emerging conceptions of reasons and goals could be integrated with the traditional conception of causal (1-1) Why did she reveal the guy's name?-She was just . . . she's like that. She has nothing to hide.
(1-2) Why did your roommate cook all her food in the dorm room this year?-Well, she had all of her food with her and her hot pot and toaster oven.
In each of these cases, the agent performs an intentional action, but in none of them could we say that the explanation cites the agent's reasons for performing that action. For example, explanation (1-1) does not suggest that the agent thought "I am like that, I have nothing to hide; I should therefore reveal his name." Nonetheless, reference to these character traits somehow helps explain why the agent revealed the name. Similarly, in explanation (1-2), having her food, pot, and toaster with her was not the agent's reason for cooking in the dorm room (it wasn't as though she discovered the equipment and became motivated to cook). Even so, the presence of the cooking equipment explains an important aspect of her behavior. We need a theory that tells us both when people use alternatives to reason explanations and what the nature of these alternatives is.
Another fundamental problem that an adequate theory of behavior explanation needs to resolve is why reasons are used to explain intentional behavior in the first place. It may seem to some as obvious that they are, but At each step of the way, the questioner engages with the explainer, chronicling, as it were, the process of discovering the answer to the why-question- Consider the following examples.
(1-4) I did my senior research paper in high school on homophobia because it was just interesting.
(1-5)* I did my senior research paper in high school on homophobia Traditional attribution theorists can only shrug in light of such cases and insist that, in general, the person-situation dichotomy makes sense. The folkconceptual theory of behavior explanations, as we will see in chapter 4, can easily account for both the linguistic surface difference and the deeper similarity between these two explanations.
Consider another striking example, in which grandmother is about to purchase a car and grandson explains her decision making.
(1-6) [The car's color] wasn't a problem any more, she decided, because grandpa was dead, and he was the one that was anal retentive about cars.
Despite surface appearances, here too we do not have a situation attribu- are an essential element of social cognition and social interaction. Through behavior explanations, people find meaning in social behavior, form impressions, and influence other people's impressions; through behavior explanations, they blame and praise, coordinate interaction, and negotiate status and identity; and through these explanations, they tie together social events into narratives, bolster choices and preferences, and justify attitudes.
In short, explanations are ubiquitous in social thinking and social behavior.
There is no question, then, that a comprehensive theory is needed for this important social-cognitive tool.
Desiderata for a Theory of Behavior Explanation
The preceding review of classic and contemporary attribution theories has pointed to a number of shortcomings and unanswered questions in the extant literature. To resolve these problems and build a comprehensive scientific model of behavior explanation I propose a two-pronged approach. First, we need to recognize that explanations are people's way of finding meaning in both intentional and unintentional behavior. This meaning, however, emerges not in the ascription of person and situation causes but in the application of reasons, causes, and a variety of other modes of explanation, which are embedded in a conceptual framework called the folk theory of mind and behavior (chapter 2). By locating behavior explanations in this folk-conceptual framework, we are able to identify the various modes of explanation, their conditions of occurrence, and the cognitive processes underlying them (chapter 4 and 5). In so doing, we can show that the traditional person-situation dichotomy in attribution theory obscures a number of important distinctions (chapters 6 and 8) and that person-situation ef-26 Chapter 1 fects in attribution research-a seemingly impressive body of findingsmay be based on serious misinterpretations of the evidence (e.g., chapter 7).
Second, we need to recognize that behavior explanations are a social tool that people use for a variety of social-interactive purposes. In offering explanations in social contexts, people try to manage social interactionmanage, that is, both the audience's impression of a given behavior and any joint future actions that explainer and audience might perform. These social uses of explanation, too, will be guided by people's folk-conceptual framework, because altering impressions of behavior occurs against the backdrop of shared fundamental assumptions about mind and behavior (chapters 3 and 6). Thus, the program of this book is to introduce the elements of people's conceptual framework of mind and behavior in which explanations are embedded and to offer a scientific theory of behavior explanations that recognizes this framework and takes into account both functions of behavior explanations: to find meaning and to manage interactions.
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